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Case No. 18142 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action commenced by Plaintiffs-Respondents 
for enforcement of a provision in a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract relating to assumptions of encumbrances and for 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a result 
of Defendants' breach of contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
and Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Sununary Judgment ordering inunediate transfer of 
title to certain real property from Defendants to Plaintiffs 
and further ordering both parties to bear their own costs 
and attorneys' fees. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-Respondents seek affirmance of the lower 
court judgment requiring Appellants-Defendants to convey 
their rights, title, and interest as to the property involved 
in this litigation but seek a reversal of the lower court's 
order denying Plaintiffs-Respondents' attorneys' fees and 
costs at the trial level. In addition, Respondents seek 
attorneys' fees and costs for defense of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents do not seriously disagree with the State-
ment of Facts preferred by the Appellants. However, Respon-
dents believe that some of the "facts" are irrelevant for 
purposes of review of this Sununary Judgment proceeding and 
further that arguments of counsel (cited by Defendants) do 
not constitute evidence sufficient to establish facts which 
Appellants now argue. For these reasons, therefore, Respon-
dents shall state the facts which they believe are both 
relevant and supported by competent evidence. 
On December 20, 1975 Appellants purchased property 
located in Panguitch, Utah from Vance Pope and Emily Pope. 
The contract consisted of a separately typed agreement since 
no standard real estate printed forms were utilized. (R. 7-19). 
The agreement called for purchase of the "Bryceway Motel and 
Restaurant" at a purchase price of $270,000 at a rate of 7% 
-2-
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interest. The contract contained a schedule of payments to 
be made in January and.July of each year until the balance 
had been paid. 
Paragraph 5 of this Agreement recognized the existence 
of prior obligations on the property and stated that the 
sellers (Popes) agreed to assume and pay the obligations 
and to hold the buyers harmless. Paragraph 6 of that agree-
ment forbid the sellers (Popes) from obtaining additional 
loans on the property other than the two previously described 
obligations without the consent of the buyers. 
As additional security for the transaction the buyers 
(defendants herein) also pledged property located near Pan-
guitch Lake and their personal residence. The agreement 
provided that when the balance of the contract was reduced 
to $200,000 that these properties would then be released. (R.l 
The Pope-Farnsworth agreement (hereinafter "Pope Contract" 
encompassed a motel, cafe, trailer park, all of the personal 
property and water rights needed to operate these enterprises, 
and in addition three residential dwellings which generated 
rental income. 
In April of 1978 a sale of the motel, cafe, and trailer 
park was negotiated between Defendants and plaintiffs Nick 
Faulkner and his wife Karyl. In order to effectuate a tax-
free exchange the motel property was purchased in the name of 
-3-
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Tom C. Thorpe. (R. 4-5) • The contract was immediately assigned 
by Thorpe to plaintiffs Faulkner. (R. 6). The purchase from 
the defendants encompassed all of the property previously sold 
to them by Popes with the exception of the three residential 
rental properties. 
The Farnsworth-Thorpe contract (hereinafter "Thorpe 
Contract") provided for a purchase price of $300,000, a down 
payment of $35,000, and required a monthly payment together 
with specified balloon payment. An 8% interest rate was 
imposed. 
The Thorpe Contract was contained on a printed Uniform 
Real Estate Contract form which had been filled out by 
respondent Nick Faulkner who was a real estate agent and broker. 
Paragraph 6 of the Thorpe Uniform Real Estate Contract 
stated the following: "It is understood that there presently 
exists an obligation against said property in favor of 
George H. Talbot and H. Vance Pope with an unpaid balance 
of $ 
---------
as of 
~-------------
which shall be 
the sellers obligation to pay and discharge." (Emphasis added 
as to typed portion of paragraph) . 
Paragraph 8 of the agreement provided the following: 
The Seller is given the option to secure, 
execute and maintain loans secured by said 
property of not to exceed the then unpaid contract 
balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of 
not to exceed 8% per annum and payable in regular 
-4-
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monthly installments; provided that the aggregate 
monthly installment payments required to be made 
by seller on said loans shall not be greater than 
each installment payment required to be made by 
the buyer under this contract. When the principal 
due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of 
any such loans and mortgages the seller agrees 
to convey and the buyer agrees to accept title 
to the above-described property subject to said 
loans and mortgages. 
In September and November of 1980 Respondents through 
their. attorney made written demand upon Appellants for con-
veyance of the property subject to the Pope Contract. 
Appellants refused to make such conveyance and insisted that 
the terms of the Thorpe Contract be enforced. 
This action was commenced by plaintiffs N.ick Faulkner 
and his wife seeking a declaration that the defendants had 
breached the terms of paragraph 8 by their failure to convey 
title to the plaintiffs, seeking an order of the court 
requiring such conveyance be made, and requesting costs and 
reasonable attorneys' fees. (R. 1-3). 
On March 5, 1981 Defendants moved to dismiss on the 
basis that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim against Defen-
dants and had failed to join an indispensible party. (R. 
43-44). The motion to dismiss was denied by the lower court. 
(R. 102) . 
A motion for summary judgment was made in September of 
1981 by the plaintiffs. (R. 108). A hearing was held in the 
lower court on October 16, 1981 at which time the parties 
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agreed that Defendants' prior motion for dismissal could be 
treated as a motion for summary judgment. (Tr. 45). The 
lower court determined that the contract was not ambiguous 
and ordered Defendants to execute all necessary documents 
to transfer all right, title, and interest in the property 
at the time Plaintiffs tendered to Defendants the monetary 
difference existing between the Pope Contract balance and 
the Thorpe Contract balance. (R. 135-136) . 
The court also ordered each side to bear its own costs 
and attorneys' fees. (R. 136). The reason for this ruling 
was stated by the lower court at the hearing as follows: 
Well, as far as I am concerned, the court 
finds that the plaintiffs prepared the contract 
and I am not going to grant attorneys' fees in 
this matter; I am not going to grant costs. I 
feel that's laying it on top and I am not going 
to do it. I am making a specific finding for 
no attorneys' fees and costs awarded in this 
matter. (Tr. 49). 
On November 25, 1981 Defendants filed their Notice of 
Appeal from the lower court order. On December 14, Plaintiffs 
filed a cross-appeal as to the failure of the lower court 
to award costs and attorneys' fees. (R. 153) . On this same 
date the lower court granted a stay until final determination 
of the appeal. (R. 151). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FARNSWORTH-THORPE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WAS 
-6-
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NOT AMBIGUOUS AND THEREFORE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WAS PROPER. 
Defendants-Appellants argue that sununary judgment was 
improper in this case since the Thorpe Contract was ambiguous 
and required extrinsic evidence to determine the intention 
of the parties. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 6-9). This argument, 
however, is without merit since the real estate contract is 
not ambiguous and therefore requires no factual determination. 
Respondents do -not disagree with the authorities cited 
by Appellants as to the standard of review for summary judgment 
and for interpretation of written contracts. (Appellants' 
Brief, pp. 6-7). These authorities cited by Appellants clearly 
state that a contract must be interpreted within its own four 
corners unless it is "ambiguous" and extrinsic facts are 
required to determine the intent of the parties. 
Whether a contract is ambiguous or uncertain is a 
question of law to be initially determined by the trial court. 
Evenson Masonry, Inc. v. Eldred, 543 P.2d 663 (Ore. 1975). 
The lower court in this case specifically held that the contrac 
was not ambiguous. (Tr. 4 8) . 
Language in a contract is "ambiguous" when the words 
used to express the meaning and intention of the parties are 
insufficient in that the contract may be understood to reach 
two or more possible meanings. First National Bank of Olathe 
v. Clark, 602 P.2d 1299 (Kan. 1979). Ambiguity in a contract 
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is the effect of words that have either no definite sense or 
have more than one, causing doubt by reasonable men of its 
meaning. Bartlam v. Tikka, 622 P.2d 1130 (Ore. App. 1981). 
See also, Amoco Production Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co. of 
Wyoming, 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1980); State v. Fairbanks North 
Star Borough School District, 621 P.2d 1329 (Alaska 1981). 
Two other rules of construction should also be noted. 
First, courts will not torture words and phrases to import 
ambiguity where their ordinary meaning leaves no room for 
ambiguity. Lampley .v. Celebrity Homes, Inc., 594 P.2d 605 
(Colo. App. 1979). Second, the mere fact that parties urge 
diverse definitions of contract terminology or differing 
contract interpretations does not render the contract ambiguous. 
Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980); Jones v. Hinkle, 
611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980). 
A review of the Thorpe Contract shows that it is clearly 
not ambiguous. Appellants assert, to the contrary, that 
paragraph 6 is inconsistent with paragraph 8 in that paragraph 
6 recognizes the Pope obligation and then states {in type) 
that it shall be the ''seller's obligation to pay and discharge." 
Appellants assert that this is inconsistent with the language 
(in print) contained in paragraph 8 because it is unclear 
whether the Pope obligation is included as a "loan secured 
by said property." (Appellants' Brief, PP· 7-8) • Appellants 
-8-
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further argue that "the parties apparently expressed their 
intent to exclude the Pope obligation from the applicability 
to paragraph 8 by the typed clause of paragraph 6." (Appel-
lants' Brief, p. 8). 
This argument is without substance. Paragraph 6 
recognizes the Pope mortgage and provides that the seller 
is obligated to pay and discharge it. There is nothing 
unusual or ambiguous about this provision since it is m~rely 
stating that the sellers are responsible for the Pope loan 
and that as of the moment of contract it has not been assigned 
to the buyer as his obligation. Paragraph 8, on the other 
hand, states that at such time when the balance of any loan 
falls below the amount owed on the contract that the buyer 
can assume such loan and mortgage and that the sellers must 
convey title. There is no language contained in paragraph 8 
excepting the Pope Contract from its provision. 
This Court in Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980) 
dealt with almost an identical argument advanced by the defen-
dant in that case who also refused to convey title when the 
plaintiff buyer demanded it. This Court stated: 
Paragraph 3 of the contract provides for 
full payment each month "until contract balance 
is paid in full." Defendants argue that the 
typewritten language of paragraph 3 of the 
contract supercedes the printed language of 
paragraph 8. It is defendants' position that 
the parties contemplated a continuing contract 
until the full purchase price was paid. If this 
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position were correct, paragraph 8, providing 
for conveyance of title before full payment of 
the purchase price, would have no meaning. It 
is axiomatic that a contract should be inter-
preted so as to harmonize all of its provisions. 
Vance v. Arnold, 114 Utah 463, 201 P.2d 475 (1949). 
This Court then continued to explain why paragraph 8 was 
applicable. It stated: 
Although paragraph 3 of the real estate 
contract sets out the basic payment scheme, it 
does not mandate specified monthly payments as 
the only method of making payment. Paragraph 
4 provides for the payment of amounts in excess 
of the regular monthly payments, and accelerated 
payments are allowed by paragraph 9 of the con-
tract. It is significant that paragraph 9 
expressly refers both to loan obligations out-
standing at the date of the contract and to 
obligations incurred after the execution of the 
contract. Paragraph 8 applies to "any" loan 
secured by the property and does not expressly 
exclude the existing mortgage identified in 
paragraph 6. In our view, paragraph 3 does not 
preclude the right to conveyance of title pursuant 
to paragraph 8 according to the clear terms of 
that provision and in light of the language of 
paragraph 9. Id. at 735. (Emphasis added). 
Here, there is nothing in the contract which precludes 
the buyer from assuming the sellers' obligation to pay and 
discharge the Pope Contract. There is no language contained 
in paragraph 8 excluding the Pope mortgage as a "loan" as 
contained in that paragraph. Just as in Hinkle, the agree-
ment in this case is not ambiguous and clearly allows the 
assumption of the existing Pope mortgage at such time as the 
balances conformed with the requirements of paragraph 8. 
Next, Appellants attempt to argue that the initial 
-10-
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balances between the Pope Contract and the Thorpe Contract 
indicate an ambiguity since at the time of the contract the 
Pope balance was only slightly higher than the Thorpe balance 
and therefore Clause 8 would have taken effect immediately. 
(Appellants' Brief, pp, 8-9). This argument is also without 
merit. 
First, there is nothing contained in the contract 
itself which shows the balance of the Pope Contract and 
therefore any after-acquired escrow balances are extrinsic 
evidence which is not admissible unless the contract itself 
is ambiguous. Second, the initial balances of the contract 
changed almost immediately and as stated by Defendants them-
selves, in September and November of 1980 the Pope obligation 
was some $4,000 below the Thorpe obligation. (R. 86). 
Plaintiffs in November of 1981 tendered the then-existing 
difference of some $6,000 to the defendants in order to 
equalize the contract which would then activate the language 
contained in paragraph 8. (R. 133-134). It is clear that 
the structure of the contracts provided for a fluctuation in 
the difference between the two balances and therefore the 
initial balances are no more relevant to the intent of the 
parties than are the balances three or four years subsequent 
to the agreement. 
There is no evidence that the underlying Pope balance 
-11-
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was ever considered in the Thorpe Contract or that Thorpe 
or the plaintiffs had any knowledge of the balance. It is 
submitted, however, that such a determination as to the 
actual balances or the knowledge of the parties as to the 
balances is irrelevant since the contract itself is 
unambiguous and the balances are extrinsic to the specific 
terms of the contract. 
Finally, Appellants misconstrue the Bullough case 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 9) in that the conduct of the parties 
only becomes relevant after it has been determined that the 
underlying contract is ambiguous and only then will the court_ 
look to extrinsic factors to determine what the contract meant. 
In this case, however, there is no patent ambiguity and there 
is nothing in the agreement which precludes Plaintiffs from 
assuming the Pope Contract and from requiring Defendants to 
convey title subject to such assumption. 
The lower court was correct, therefore in concluding 
that no ambiguity exited and that the matter was ripe for 
summary judgment. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS SINCE THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS 
CLEARLY REQUIRED CONVEYANCE BY DEFENDANTS OF THEIR 
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
Appellants state that the lower court relied heavily upon 
this Court's decision of Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 
-12-
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1980). (Appellants' Brief, p. 10). This "reliance" was 
certainly justified since the Hinkle case is almost identical 
to the present controversy. As will be discussed infra, 
Appellants' attempts to distinguish it are to no avail. 
In Hinkle a purchaser brought action for specific per-
formance of a real estate property contract. The lower court 
entered summary judgment in favor of the sellers and the pur-
chasers appealed. Both parties had moved for summary judgment 
in the lower court. 
The contract in Hinkle concerned residential property 
located in Utah County. The seller had a previous outstanding 
mortgage with a savings and loan institution. In paragraph 6 
of the identical real estate contract utilized in this case 
it was stated, "It is understood that there presently exists 
an obligation against said property in favor of Deseret Federal 
Savings & Loan with an unpaid balance of $31,836.78 as of 
May 1, 1977." The plaintiff made monthly payments and one 
balloon payment in accordance with the terms of the contract 
and then notified the defendants that since the balance on 
the outstanding mortgage was below her contract price that 
the sellers should convey title pursuant to paragraph 8 subject 
only to the outstanding mortgage. The defendants refused 
to transfer title. 
This Court rejected the argument that paragraph 8 only 
-13-
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applied to obligations assumed after the contract's initia-
tion and stated that it specifically applied to "any" loan 
secured by the property and does not exclude existing mort-
gages. This Court held that paragraph 8 was conditioned solely 
upon the reduction of the unpaid principal to the amount of 
the outstanding obligations and that once this amount had 
been met defendants were obligated to convey in accordance 
with the terms of the contract. 
The purpose of paragraph 8 is to allow a seller who 
retains title to the property the benefit of the property 
by being able to still maintain or secure additional loans 
based upon the property as security. However, the 
provision prevents the seller from encumbering the property 
in excess of the value of the contract thereby protecting 
the buyer from having encumbrances placed upon the property 
which are in excess of the seller's interest. 
As noted earlier, no attempt was made to modify either 
paragraph 6 or paragraph 8 to exclude the Pope obligation 
from the terms of paragraph 8. It should be noted, on the 
other hand, that the defendants in their contract with Pope 
specifically precluded the sellers {Popes) from securing any 
other additional loans besides the two outstanding obligations 
already present at the time of sale. {R. 10) .. In this case, 
however, no such language was contained and therefore the 
-14-
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the defendants (who are now the sellers) were free to obtain 
additional loans on the property at any time the Pope obliga-
tion dipped below the contract balance owing on the Thorpe 
Contract. In other words, the defendants had specifically 
entered into provisions of a similar nature in the earlier 
Pope Contract and therefore could just as easily have limited 
the remedies available to the plaintiffs in the Thorpe Contract 
had· they so desired. 
Appellants argue that the contract is not "free from ambi-
guity" as in Hinkle. (Appellants' Brief, p. 10). Again, howev 
if the language in the Hinkle case is examined and compared wit 
the language in the instant case there is no ambiguity. Instea 
Appellants insist that this Court must "look behind the contrac 
to other relevant documents and extraneous evidence" (Appellan 
Brief, p. 10) which requires, according to Appellants, that the 
Pope obligation be excluded from paragraph 8. As noted in the 
prior section, however, courts do not attempt to create ambigui 
by looking to extrinsic evidence but rather look to extrinsic 
evidence to resolve- ambiguities present in the contract languag 
itself. Here, there is no such contractual ambiguity. 
Appellants attempt by extrinsic arguments to show why 
the Pope obligation was excluded from the paragraph language. 
Again, these arguments are completely irrelevant unless the 
-15-
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document itself is ambiguous. However, even assuming rele-
vance arguendo the arguments do not support Defendants' claim 
that the Pope obligation was meant to be excluded from the 
paragraph 8 language. 
First, Defendants argue that because the Pope Contract 
included three houses which the Thorpe Contract did not that 
the parties could not have intended the Pope obligation to be 
included in paragraph 8. Appellants state: "It would be 
impractical to attempt to divide title to the property while 
the entire title rests with Pope pending complete satisfaction 
of the original obligation." (Appellants' Brief, p. 11). 
This statement completely ignores the fact that the Defendants 
had already divided and segregated the three houses from the 
remainder of the property when they sold the motel, restaurant, 
and trailer park to the plaintiffs. The legal descriptions 
contained in the Thorpe Contract (R. 4) is completely different 
from that contained in the Pope Contract. (R. 21-22). 
Paragraph 8 only required Defendants to deed to Plaintiffs 
their interest in the property contained in the Thorpe Contract. 
Defendants would not have been required to deed their interest 
in the three houses since they were not included in the Thorpe 
Contract and were not being purchased by Plaintiffs. Thus, 
Defendants would have given up nothing as to these three houses 
nor was there any "practical" problem involved since a division 
had already occurred. 
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Next, Defendants assert that since other property was 
secured in the Pope Contract it would have been unfair to 
allow Plaintiffs to assume the obligation. Again, however, 
such argument makes no sense. Defendants agreed to give to 
the Popes liens on other real property in addition to the 
motel, cafe, and trailer park involved in the transaction. 
The contract provided that when the balance owing reached 
$230,000 that the first property would be released and that 
upon reaching $200,000 the second property would be released. 
(R. 10). The Popes were obligated to release these properties 
regardless of whether the balance was reduced b¥ the payments 
coming from Defendants or coming from Plaintiffs. Had Plaintif 
defaulted in their payments Defendants would have again assumed 
the contract and continued to make payments. In any event, 
however, the defendants had agreed in the Pope Contract to a 
specified payment ~nd time schedule and the assumption by Plain 
tiffs·, therefore,would not have altered this payment or time 
schedule in any way. 
The most that Defendants can complain about is the fact 
that had they continued to receive the accelerated balloon 
payments of Plaintiffs under the Thorpe Contract the defen-
dants could have obtained a release of their properties sooner. 
However, there is nothing in any of these contracts which 
requires an earlier release or which states that Defendants 
-17-
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must apply the accelerated payments corning from Plaintiffs 
to the Pope Contract for the purpose of accelerating the 
release of the two other properties. 
Finally, the same argument is advanced by Defendants that 
the assumption of the contract by Plaintiffs will preclude 
the release of the three houses contained in the Pope· agreement 
but excluded in the Thorpe agreement. (Appellants' Brief, 
pp. 11-12). Again, there is no contractual language in either 
contract giving Defendants a right to the early release of 
these three properties. It was completely optional on the 
part of Defendants whether they wished to accelerate payments 
under the Pope agreement or whether they wished to continue 
under the payment schedule provided. 
Likewise, there is nothing contained in the Thorpe Con-
tract which condictions the accelerated balloon payments of 
Plaintiffs for the purpose of paying off the Pope obligation 
in an expedited manner. While Defendants may well have intended 
on applying the payments received from Plaintiffs entirely 
to the Pope Contract there was no contractual obligation to 
so do. Plaintiffs cannot be now penalized simply because 
Defendants' intention may have been thwarted by their failure 
to provide contractual language to effectuate this claimed 
desire. 
The preceding attempts to distinguish the Hinkle case 
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must fail. None of these extrinsic facts or supposed desires 
of the defendants are contained in the contract itself. The 
contract simply and plainly requires Defendants to convey 
their interest in the contracted for property at the time 
when the Pope obligation and the Thorpe obligation become 
equal. There is no doubt that this fact occurred or would 
have occurred had the defendants accepted the tender made 
by Plaintiffs to equalize the balances. Thus, just as in 
Hinkle, the lower court was correct in granting sununary judgment 
and requiring the defendants to convey their interest in the 
property subject to the Pope obligation. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS AND THIS COURT 
SHOULD ALSO AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS. 
The lower court refused to grant to Plaintiffs attorneys' 
fees or costs on the assumption that Plaintiffs had prepared 
the document and therefore were not entitled to these expen-
ditures. (Tr. 49). The respondents have cross-appealed from 
this denial since the lower court was clearly erroneous in 
precluding attorneys' fees and costs. 
First, the fact that Plaintiffs prepared the agreement 
1s irrelevant for purposes of determining attorneys' fees. 
The question of who drafted an instrument 1s only germane 
when an ambiguity exists in the language and then only to the 
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extent that a presumption is made against the drafter. Here, 
the lower court specifically found no ambiguity as to the 
assumption provision and Defendants did not ever argue an 
ambiguity as to the attorneys' fees and costs provisions. 
Thus, the facts that Plaintiffs prepared the contract by 
filling in the printed form is completely irrelevant to an 
award of attorneys' fees and costs. 
Second, Defendants argue that the language contained in 
the contract only permits attorneys' fees for a "default" and 
that the court did not declare a default or breach of contract 
by Appellants as pled by Respondents !.in ~heir :complaint. 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 13). 
This argument attempts to put form over substance. 
Obviously, the court found that the defendant had breached 
their obligation to convey the property to Plaintiffs and 
ordered such conveyance to occur. It is not necessary for 
the court to specifically make a finding of a default or 
breach in a motion for sununary judgment. This Court in the 
Hinkle case specifically held that attorneys' fees and costs 
were required in a dispute involving the identical clauses. 
This Court stated: 
As to the award of attorneysi fees to 
defendants, we reverse the trial court and 
direct it to award such fees to plaintiffs. 
The contract provides that the defaulting 
party shall pay costs and expenses, including 
a reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in 
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enforcing the agreement. Defendants were in 
default for their failure to convey title 
pursuant to Paragraph 8, and they are therefore 
liable to Plaintiffs for the expenses of this 
action. 611 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1980). 
Finally, Appellants rely upon the case of Swain v. Salt 
Lake Real Estate and Investment Co., 279 P.2d 709 (Utah 1955) 
to state that attorneys' fees on appeal are discretionary with 
the Supreme Court. This reliance is misplaced since this 
Court specifically overruled the Swain decision in Management 
Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 
1980) . The Court stated the following concerning a question 
of attorneys' fees on appeal in an action involving a real 
estate contract: 
The parties here agreed to pay reasonable 
attorneys' fees if it became necessary to enforce 
the contract. If plaintiff is required to defend 
its position on appeal at its own expense plain-
tiff's rights under the contract are thereby 
diminished. We therefore adopt the rule of law 
that a provision for payment of attorneys' fees 
in a contract includes appeal as well as at trial, 
if the action is brought to enforce the contract, 
and overrule Swain and Downey State Bank on this 
point insofar as they may be to the contrary. Id. 
at 409. 
The lower court erred in failing to award a reasonable 
attorneys' fee and costs to Plaintiffs. In addition, this 
Court should remand to the lower court for a determination 
as to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary Judgment was developed as a means to eliminate 
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an unnecessary trial when no question of fact exists. Here, 
there can be no doubt that summary judgment was proper unless 
it can be said that a factual dispute is present. A factual 
dispute is present.only if this Court accepts Defendants' 
argument that the contract on its face is ambiguous and 
requires extrinsic factual evidence to determine the intent 
of the parties. 
The contract on its face, however, as a matter of law 
is not ambiguous. Paragraph 6 and paragraph 8 are not incon-
sistent. Paragraph 6 merely states that Defendants were 
obligated to make the payments as to the Pope Contract there-
by eliminating any question as to who should make these under-
lying obligation payments. However, paragraph 6 does not in 
any way negate the effect of paragraph 8 which permits a 
transfer of title upon the assumption by Plaintiffs of the 
underlying obligation when the balances of the two contracts 
have equalized. · 
The lower court was correct in finding that no ambiguity 
existed in the contract language. Further, the court correctly 
applied the terms of the contract in accordance with this 
Court's decision in Hinkle. The supposed distinction between 
this case and Hinkle are completely without merit and the 
Hinkle case is binding precedent to the very issue now being 
litigated. 
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Finally, the lower court erred in failing to follow the 
Hinkle decision as to attorneys' fees and costs and Plaintiffs-
Respondents are clearly entitled to these awards in order to 
prevent a penalty being levied against them for enforcement 
of their contract. Likewise, this Court should order a remand 
for purposes of determining reasonable attorneys' fees and 
costs of this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Respondents 
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